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Central Bank Tools
and Liquidity Shortages
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
he global financial crisis that began in mid-2007 has 
renewed concerns about financial instability and focused 
attention on the fundamental role of central banks in 
preventing and managing systemic crises. In response to the 
turmoil, central banks have made extensive use of both new and 
existing tools for supplying central bank money to financial 
institutions and markets. Against this backdrop, there has been 
intense interest in the implications that recent financial 
developments may have for the fundamental nature of central 
banks’ lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) function and whether the 
traditional tools that have been at policymakers’ disposal 
remain adequate in the face of modern liquidity crises. This 
paper addresses these issues, and in doing so provides a view of 
recent central bank liquidity operations that is tied more closely 
to their underlying purpose from the LOLR perspective.
We begin in Section 2 by defining three types of liquidity 
shortages that central banks may need to address in operations 
aimed at stabilizing the financial system. In taking this 
approach, we emphasize the fact that the conditions under 
which central bank liquidity—reserves or central bank 
money—is made available should, and do, differ depending on 
the underlying nature of the problem officials are trying to 
mitigate. This means that there may not be a single set of 
principles for central banks’ LOLR function. Recognizing this 
goes some way toward reconciling the debate surrounding the 
appropriate role of LOLR.1
After providing our definitions, in Section 3 we proceed 
with a discussion of the tools that central banks have at their 
disposal and how they might be tailored to address each type of 
liquidity shortage. Section 4 offers a brief description of how 
recent actions by major central banks can be interpreted from 
this perspective; Section 5 concludes. We note at the outset that 
our focus is on central bank liquidity operations and not on 
policymakers’ interest rate responses.
2. Liquidity Shortages and 
the Lender of Last Resort
Apart from the conduct of monetary policy, a vital 
responsibility of central banks in most countries is to perform 
the role of LOLR. At its core, the objective of the LOLR is to 
prevent, or at least mitigate, financial instability through the 
provision of liquidity support either to individual financial 
institutions or to financial markets. The underlying premise is 
that shortages of liquidity, by which we mean the inability of an 
institution to acquire cash or means of payment at low cost, can 
lead to otherwise preventable failures of institutions that then 
1 We do not enter the debate over whether the LOLR takes the place of a deposit 
insurance system. Recent events, especially the retail bank runs that 
accompanied the nationalization of Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, 
would appear to have settled the matter in favor of the importance of a rule-
based deposit insurance system.
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result in spillover and contagion effects that may ultimately 
engulf the financial system more broadly with significant 
implications on the real economy.2 By signaling its willingness 
and ability to act decisively, the central bank demonstrates 
its intention to restore confidence in the system by avoiding 
“fire sales” of assets and supporting market functioning.
The “classical” doctrine of the LOLR as attributed to 
Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873) is commonly interpreted 
to imply that such lending should be extended freely without 
limit, but only to solvent institutions at penalty rates and 
against good collateral (for example, see Rochet and Vives 
[2004]). This set of principles has been subject to substantial 
debate for much of the past thirty years, with many issues yet 
to be resolved.3
At their most basic level, the underlying principles of 
Bagehot’s original dictum have been subject to a variety of 
interpretations. Goodhart (1999), for example, emphasizes 
that Bagehot’s criteria for lending were not conditioned on the 
individual borrower but on the availability of good collateral. 
As such, the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency 
would not be an important issue. Similarly, while the 
imposition of a penalty rate has traditionally been judged 
relative to the prevailing market rate, it can be argued that 
Bagehot advocated only that lending take place at a rate higher 
than the precrisis level. Given that the LOLR strives to achieve 
the good—panic-free—equilibrium, a case can be made that 
the penalty ought to be relative to the interest rate during 
normal times rather than the higher rate that obtains in the 
market during a panic (Goodhart 1999). Indeed, in practice, 
LOLR lending has frequently taken place at prevailing market 
rates (Giannini 1999).
At a more practical level, the distinction between illiquidity 
and insolvency has been largely dismissed on the grounds that 
banks generally face liquidity problems when solvency is in 
question (Goodhart and Schoenmaker 1995). Indeed, an 
individual bank will seek assistance from the monetary 
authorities only when it cannot meet its liquidity needs in 
financial markets. Since the wholesale interbank money market 
is the first stop for most banks, this almost certainly means that 
there are significant doubts about the institution’s ultimate 
solvency. The proposition that central banks only lend against 
good collateral is also undermined by the fact that a bank that 
is unable to raise funds in the market must, almost by 
definition, lack access to good security for collateralized loans. 
As such, emergency lending assistance from the central bank 
will likely be against collateral of questionable quality. In 
addition, the imposition of a penalty rate has been criticized on 
2 This definition of LOLR is quite broad and can, in principle, encompass any 
injection of central bank reserves, including routine ones. That said, we focus 
primarily on extraordinary interventions driven by unanticipated events. 
3 See Davis (2008) and Rochet (2008) for detailed expositions of the various views.
the grounds that such a policy could compound the problem if 
it imposes a substantial burden on the troubled institution.
At the same time, another facet of the debate has focused on 
the appropriate implementation of LOLR support. Some argue 
that in an advanced financial system, LOLR should be 
exclusively through open market operations. As long as 
systemwide changes in demand for reserves are met through 
such operations, the market can direct reserves to those most 
in need, thereby avoiding the mispricing that administrative 
mechanisms might create (Schwartz 1992; Kaufman 1991; 
Goodfriend and King 1988). Such an approach was clearly 
successful, for example, in the case of operations associated 
with the spikes in liquidity demand during the Y2K episode and 
in the aftermath of the stock market crash of October 1987. 
However, others argue that LOLR may require direct lending, 
not open market operations, as the market may fail to deliver 
liquidity to distressed banks whose failure threatens the 
financial system (Rochet and Vives 2004; Freixas et al. 2000; 
Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet 2000; Goodhart 1999).
2.1 Three Kinds of Liquidity Shortages
Rather than getting mired in the theoretical debate on the 
design and role of the LOLR, we take a more pragmatic 
approach and outline the broad conditions under which 
central banks’ provision of liquidity is undertaken in practice. 
From this we derive some general principles that apply 
depending on the specific situation. Indeed, once it is 
recognized that the nature of the LOLR differs across 
circumstances, many of the issues at the center of the 
theoretical debate fade.
It is useful at the outset to distinguish between three types of 
liquidity: central bank liquidity, market liquidity, and funding 
liquidity. Central bank liquidity is the term we use to describe 
deposits of financial institutions at the central bank; it is 
synonymous with reserves, or settlement balances. These 
reserve balances are held by financial institutions to meet 
reserve requirements, if any, and to achieve final settlement of 
all financial transactions in the payments system. Individual 
institutions can borrow and lend these funds in the interbank 
market, but, for the system as a whole, the only source of these 
funds is the central bank itself.
Market liquidity refers to the ability to buy and sell assets in 
reasonably large quantities without significantly affecting price. 
This use of the term “liquidity” is closest to the common, 
textbook definition: the ease with which an asset can be 
converted into means of payment (that is, money or cash).
Finally, there is funding liquidity. This term describes the 
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equivalent, again in reasonably large quantities, either via asset 
sales or by borrowing. As such, market and funding liquidity 
are closely linked (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2007]).
With this distinction in mind, our discussion of central 
banks’ liquidity operations and their appropriate structure 
with respect to the fulfillment of the LOLR function is best 
premised on the clear separation of three kinds of liquidity 
shortages: a shortage of central bank liquidity, an acute 
shortage of funding liquidity at specific institutions, and a 
systemic shortage of funding and market liquidity. We now 
proceed to describe each of these in turn.
Shortage of Central Bank Liquidity
The first kind of liquidity shortage is perhaps the most benign 
and occurs when institutions find themselves short of the 
reserve balances that they wish to hold, either because of 
inadequacies in the aggregate supply of reserves or problems 
associated with their distribution within the system. In this 
situation, financial institutions risk being unable to fulfill their 
immediate payment obligations, creating the potential for 
“gridlock” in the payments system. Typically, the tensions 
manifest themselves in a spike in the overnight interest rate but 
may sometimes also be transmitted to other segments of the 
money market as well. For the most part, these problems occur 
in the absence of any concern over the solvency of specific 
institutions.
When central bank liquidity shortages occur as a result of 
problems associated with the distribution of reserves, the 
underlying cause is typically technical in nature, having to 
do with either technological glitches or mismanagement of 
liquidity positions. The computer malfunction at the Bank of 
New York on November 20, 1985, which resulted in a large 
shortage of cash despite the bank’s patent solvency, and the 
September 2001 crisis are examples of such situations. The 
immediate problem confronting central banks in each case was 
the dislocation of reserves, reflecting a breakdown in payments 
systems and the coexistence of institutions unable to lend 
excess funds to institutions that desperately needed them.
A shortage of central bank liquidity can also arise from 
an inadequate supply of reserves to the system as a whole.4 
This may reflect an error in the central bank’s forecast of 
autonomous factors affecting liquidity conditions (for 
example, as a result of unexpected changes in the Treasury’s 
balances with the central bank) or a sudden, unanticipated shift 
in demand, or both. At the beginning of August 2007, for 
4 Since it assumes that the interbank market is still functioning normally, 
this situation is close in nature to the problem envisaged by Goodfriend
and King (1988).
example, a sharp rise in uncertainty over future funding 
availability led to an abrupt increase in demand for reserves in 
the system as a whole. This put considerable upward pressure 
on overnight rates, and many central banks initially found it 
harder to achieve their policy targets. The natural policy 
response was an immediate increase in the supply of reserves in 
an effort to meet what officials hoped would be a brief shortage 
of central bank liquidity.
Acute Shortage of Funding Liquidity
at Specific Institutions
The second kind of liquidity shortage occurs when a particular 
institution experiences an acute shortage of funding liquidity 
associated with solvency concerns as the willingness of 
counterparties to trade with the institution dissipates. This 
situation can arise as the result of a flawed business strategy—
which becomes evident often only ex post—that has left the 
institution exposed to persistent cash drains. Reflecting 
substantial perceived insolvency, the shortage of liquidity is 
prolonged and the form of assistance needed is essentially 
bridge financing that allows time for fundamental 
restructuring.
The primary threat posed by an institution-specific acute 
liquidity shortage, and hence the main justification for any 
official assistance, is that failure may result in contagion and 
spillover effects that could put the entire financial system at 
risk. The key criterion in the consideration of liquidity support 
is then whether the institution in question is systemically 
important or not. The distinction between illiquidity and 
insolvency is not really relevant. Prominent examples of 
situations in which an acute shortage of funding liquidity at 
certain institutions necessitated LOLR support include 
Continental Illinois in 1984 and the provision of liquidity 
support to various bank and nonbank financial institutions 
in the current crisis.
Systemic Shortage of Funding and Market Liquidity
The final form of liquidity shortage—a systemic shortage of 
both funding and market liquidity—is potentially the most 
destructive. It involves tensions emanating from an 
evaporation of confidence and from coordination failures 
among market participants that lead to a breakdown of key 
financial markets. Markets, just as intermediaries, may be 
subject to “runs” that are driven by fundamentally similar 
forces. As we saw in the immediate aftermath of the September 
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and prolonged evaporation of both market and funding 
liquidity, with serious consequences for the stability of both 
the financial system and the real economy.
Such crises are generally associated with a sharp rise in 
market participants’ uncertainty about asset values as well as 
about the financial strength of potential counterparties. 
Because financial markets need participants to function, a 
sharp rise in uncertainty that causes many players to disengage 
results in illiquid markets (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
[2008]). As a direct consequence, assets that were thought to 
be easily convertible into cash are not, which creates funding 
liquidity problems for individuals and institutions. This, in 
turn, heightens the credit risk of potential counterparties. The 
dynamics of these systemic crises are then driven by a mutually 
reinforcing feedback process involving market liquidity, 
funding liquidity, and counterparty credit risk.5 The 1987 stock 
market crash is an example of such a situation, and systemic 
liquidity shortages have been a prominent element of the 
current crisis from the very beginning.6
3. Central Bank Tools and 
Liquidity Shortages
The three types of liquidity shortages—central bank, acute 
institution-specific funding, and systemic funding and 
market—do not always occur in isolation. Important 
interdependencies exist, and the occurrence of one can lead to 
another with dynamics that often reinforce one another. For 
example, acute concerns about the viability of a particular 
institution can rapidly spread to a loss of confidence in other 
institutions, resulting in systemic disruptions in the interbank 
market that, in turn, hamper the distribution of reserves 
among participants, leading to problems in the payments 
system. Indeed, the current crisis that began in mid-2007 has 
involved all forms of liquidity shortages.7
In their capacity as LOLR, central banks essentially have 
three tools with which they can influence the availability of 
liquidity in the financial system. The first is lending or 
borrowing in the open market. These operations include the 
repos and reverse-repos that are the bread and butter of 
liquidity management during normal times. They are not 
5 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) provide a formal representation of this 
mutually reinforcing process. Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) and Flannery 
(1996) develop models that illustrate how coordination failures can lead to a 
systemic seizing up of the interbank market. See also Borio (2004).
6 A detailed exposition of the 1987 crisis can be found in Carlson (2007). 
7 A broad analysis of the current crisis is provided by Borio (2008), Bank for 
International Settlements (2008a, 2008b), Calomiris (2008), Cecchetti (2008), 
and Gorton (2008).
targeted at specific institutions—though they may be 
undertaken bilaterally—but are designed to address 
systemwide liquidity pressures. The operations are typically 
collateralized and conducted at the discretion of the central 
bank. The basic function is to regulate the level of aggregate 
reserves to ensure smooth functioning of the payments system 
and facilitate the attainment of the relevant policy interest rate 
target. That said, these operations can be utilized and 
structured to address a broader set of problems as well. For 
example, through these operations, central banks may lend 
not only reserves but also highly liquid securities such as 
government bonds.
The second tool is the outright purchase or sale of assets in 
the open market. These operations affect the aggregate supply 
of central bank money (reserves) on a permanent basis and are 
typically conducted in sovereign bonds denominated in either 
domestic or foreign currencies. Prior to the current episode, 
similar interventions in other asset markets were rare. The 
purchases of equities by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and by the Bank of Japan 
in 2002 were notable exceptions. The application of outright 
transactions aimed at affecting market prices is quite 
controversial and is usually justified in terms of correcting a 
fundamental misalignment in asset prices or the provision 
of two-way liquidity.
Finally, central banks can conduct transactions directed at 
specific institutions instead of markets as a whole. Unlike open 
market operations, these transactions can take place at the 
discretion of either the central bank or the financial institution 
itself, involve the channeling of liquidity directly to or from 
particular institutions, and can be either collateralized or 
uncollateralized. Examples of such operations include standing 
facilities and traditional emergency lending assistance.
The specific institutional setup of each of these three tools 
varies a great deal across countries—including differences in 
maturity, frequency, counterparty arrangements, and eligible 
collateral. These variations can have significant implications 
for how financial institutions manage their own liquidity 
positions as well as for the liquidity characteristics of various 
assets themselves.8 Moreover, the specific setup of each of these 
tools crucially determines their function during a liquidity 
crisis. Depending on their structure, each can in principle 
contribute to the alleviation of all three types of liquidity 
shortages discussed earlier. The key features that characterize 
their application to various types of crises are set out below and 
are summarized in the table. Unsurprisingly, the choice of tool 
to be employed will depend on the type of liquidity shortage 
that has arisen. Critically, this means that unlike the framework 
8 Markets Committee (2008) contains detailed descriptions of the specific 
practices for a large cross-section of countries.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2010 33
set out by Bagehot in the nineteenth century, there is no unique 
set of principles that governs how the LOLR should respond.
Before describing how central banks use their tools to 
respond to each of the aforementioned liquidity shortages, it is 
useful to note some key implications for their balance sheets. 
The fulfillment of the LOLR function typically involves 
changing the composition of assets held by the central bank, 
the overall size of its balance sheet, or both. In doing so, central 
banks will normally offset any impact on reserve balances 
outstanding in order to maintain the policy interest rate near 
its target. The main exceptions to this are: 1) if there is an 
aggregate shortage of central bank liquidity; 2) if the policy rate 
is zero; or 3) if reserves are remunerated at the policy rate. 
Whether the overall size of the balance sheet expands or not 
then depends on the choice of offsetting operations. If the latter 
is achieved by allowing one asset to substitute for another, then 
balance-sheet size is unchanged. However, if the offset is 
achieved through the issuance of various forms of central bank 
liability, such as an increase in the size of the government’s 
deposit balance or the sale of central bank bills, balance-sheet 
size increases. Typically, the latter becomes necessary as the 
scale of liquidity support rises beyond a certain point.
3.1 Shortage of Central Bank Liquidity
When central banks are faced with a shortage of reserves in the 
banking system as a whole, the primary aim of their 
intervention is to maintain the smooth functioning of the 
payments system and keep interest rates near their targets. If 
the problem is largely one of insufficient aggregate supply, all 
three forms of central bank intervention can be employed to 
address the situation. Generally, however, the preferred option 
is to accommodate the extra demand for reserves by lending in 
the open market and relying on the market to distribute 
reserves to those most in need. The provision of additional 
reserves would typically not be at a penalty rate since the 
maintenance of the appropriate aggregate supply of reserves is 
an important remit of central banks. Moreover, the underlying 
cause cannot generally be attributed to mismanagement on the 
part of banks. The sharp pickup in demand for liquidity buffers 
that began in August 2007, for example, reflected a general rise 
in uncertainty regarding future funding needs that was largely 
unforeseen.
If the shortage of reserves is caused by problems related to 
their distribution within the banking system—a situation 
associated with frictional payment shocks that leave some 
institutions suddenly and unexpectedly short of funds—the 
LOLR function can be implemented through directed liquidity 
support. Standing facilities, where banks can either deposit 
excess balances or borrow additional balances directly from the 
central bank at prespecified rates at the end of the day, are 
designed to handle these situations. Since the nature of the 
problem envisaged is largely transitory, this type of liquidity 
support is designed to be extended for a very short term, 
usually overnight. Moreover, to maintain the incentive for 
financial institutions to transact in markets, central banks tend 
to make access to standing facilities at penalty rates of interest. 
Finally, standing facilities can exert a stabilizing influence on 
markets without any funds actually being lent, since their mere 
presence can act to assure banks of orderly access to overnight 
funds. This effect is ensured by making access unambiguous.
Principles of Lender-of-Last-Resort Support
Type of Liquidity Shortage
Nature of Liquidity Support
Shortage of Central Bank 
Liquidity
Chronic Shortage of Funding 
Liquidity at Specific Institutions
Systemic Shortage of Funding
 and Market Liquidity
Distinction between illiquidity and solvency Yes No No
Directed lending or open market Either Directed Both
Lending or outright Lending Lending Both
Ambiguity of access No Yes No
Penalty relative to market rate No, if aggregate shortage 
Yes, if institution-specific No No
Quality of collateral/degree of central bank 
   risk exposure High/negligible Low/high Low-high/low-high
Term of support Very short (overnight) Long Short to medium
Public announcement of support No Depends Yes
Separation from monetary policy Yes Yes No
Coordination with fiscal authority No Yes Yes34 Central Bank Tools and Liquidity Shortages
Regardless of whether the central bank liquidity shortage is 
systemwide and institution-specific, the operations conducted 
to address it are designed explicitly to minimize the impact on 
market prices of all securities other than the overnight interest 
rate. As such, their implementation has no bearing on, nor is it 
in conflict with, the official stance of policy. Furthermore, since 
the terms are very short and all loans are fully collateralized, the 
central bank faces virtually no credit risk. The principles 
behind standing facility lending are in fact very much in line 
with conventional interpretations of Bagehot’s instructions to 
lend freely to solvent institutions, against good collateral, at a 
penalty rate. As emphasized by Paul Tucker, much of the 
central bank lending that was discretionary in Bagehot’s day 
has, in effect, become “hard coded” into the operating 
framework (Tucker 2004).
While these operations work well most of the time, the 
current crisis has highlighted some potential constraints that 
may arise in the use of both open market operations and 
traditional standing facilities. For one, financial institutions 
may not have sufficient access to the types of assets that the 
central bank regards as being of acceptable quality to serve as 
collateral. In addition, the institutions most in need of central 
bank liquidity may not have direct access to the central bank 
itself. As recent experience has shown, development of more 
global capital markets has made it more likely that disturbances 
will originate in markets and involve counterparties that are 
several steps removed from the central bank’s sphere of direct 
operation. Finally, when financial institutions lose confidence 
in nearly all potential counterparties, bringing their soundness 
into question, access to standing facilities can become 
stigmatized, impairing the effectiveness of these facilities as a 
liquidity backstop. This was particularly evident in the United 
States during 2007 and 2008, when market rates at times rose 
well above the interest rates on the facilities (see Committee on 
the Global Financial System [2008]). As we discuss in more 
detail in Section 4, central banks have addressed these 
problems by widening the pool of eligible assets, broadening 
the range of institutions with which they are willing to transact 
directly, and assuring market participants that borrowing from 
standing facilities should not be regarded as a sign of weakness.
3.2 Acute Shortage of Funding Liquidity
at Specific Institutions
When the official sector confronts an institution facing an 
acute shortage of funding liquidity, the justification for 
intervention must be that failure threatens the stability of the 
entire financial system. In such a circumstance, the solvency 
of the institution will be of secondary importance. Instead, 
central bankers are faced with a decision whether to exercise 
discretionary authority to provide emergency lending 
assistance to a particular institution. Clearly, this situation is 
distinct from the one just described, in which an institution 
finds itself short of funds at the end of the day. Rather, the 
problem is one of large-scale and potentially prolonged 
shortages of funding liquidity against which the use of standing 
facilities is inadequate or inappropriate. Furthermore, given 
the institution-specific nature of the intervention, emergency 
lending assistance can be clearly separated from the monetary 
policy stance.
Any liquidity support extended in this situation will likely 
expose the central bank to credit risk, since an institution in 
need of a loan of last resort will typically have exhausted its 
stock of both marketable assets and acceptable collateral. So the 
assets pledged to the central bank are likely to be some part of 
the borrowing bank’s loan book, or illiquid securities, or some 
physical asset whose value is uncertain. To the extent that a 
loan extended under this circumstance is, in the end, simply 
bridge financing while a takeover or major restructuring of 
the recipient institution is organized, it will generally be 
accompanied by a plan for private sector (Bear Stearns) or 
government (Northern Rock) support or recapitalization. This 
acts, at least in principle, to limit the central bank’s exposure to 
substantial losses.
A key factor determining the scope and scale of emergency 
lending to an institution facing an acute shortage of funding 
liquidity is the central bank’s ability to absorb losses. In this 
context, the current crisis highlights serious potential resource 
limitations. As financial institutions have become increasingly 
globalized, the scale of any potential support required has 
grown tremendously, requiring the joint participation of fiscal 
authorities. Moreover, in cases such as Iceland in 2008, it can 
even stretch beyond the limits of the entire official sector.
Because of the moral hazard implications, officials are 
tremendously hesitant to grant such loans. When they do, they 
not only charge high rates of interest to mitigate taxpayer 
exposure but have the ability to write down shareholder equity 
as well as replace management. Insofar as the institution is 
unable to obtain funding on its own in the market, however, 
the provision of liquidity support cannot necessarily be 
deemed punitive relative to the market rate.9 As a further 
counterbalance to moral hazard, the provision of support to 
acutely illiquid institutions is on a discretionary basis so that 
the market does not take it for granted. Such “constructive 
ambiguity” does not necessarily mean, however, that the 
9 The imposition of a penalty rate is determined largely by the degree of moral 
hazard that is associated with the provision of liquidity support. We discuss this 
further in Section 3.4.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2010 35
general set of principles that would justify emergency lending 
assistance should not be made explicit. Taylor (2009), for 
example, argues that uncertainty about what the government 
would do to aid financial institutions, and under what 
circumstances, was a key factor in the deterioration that 
marked the current crisis.
Once an emergency loan is granted, communication can be 
critical in determining the chances of success. On the one hand, 
the announcement of assistance may work to assure the public 
that the financial system is sound, thereby boosting confidence 
among market participants. On the other hand, news of 
liquidity support may confirm public fears about potential 
failures, and the institution receiving support may suffer a 
further loss of reputation. In the United Kingdom in 2007, 
news of LOLR support to Northern Rock precipitated a retail 
deposit run, which was stopped only by announcement of a 
government guarantee. In the wake of this incident, banks 
understandably became unwilling to access central bank 
lending facilities even for more benign liquidity needs, for fear 
of reputational consequences. The result was a further 
tightening up of the money market, which worsened an already 
bad situation.
While stigma is surely not a relevant issue for an ostensibly 
failing institution seeking emergency lending assistance, the 
central bank’s decision to grant a request may worsen the 
stigma associated with all forms of direct lending, complicating 
liquidity management. Confidentiality may help to prevent 
knowledge of LOLR support from giving rise to panic, but 
maintaining it is difficult in practice since banks usually know 
the approximate condition of their competitors, and the scale 
of such operations would typically necessitate public oversight.
3.3 Systemic Shortage of Funding
and Market Liquidity
The limits of the central bank’s LOLR function are most 
severely tested in a systemic liquidity crisis, not least because 
such situations are likely to be accompanied by the other 
two types of liquidity shortages as well. In this circumstance, 
the underlying aim of official intervention is to shore up 
confidence in the financial system as a whole, restoring market 
functioning through the reestablishment of both funding and 
market liquidity. This will help forestall asset fire sales, facilitate 
the orderly reduction in borrowing, support the process of 
price discovery in markets, and restore credit flows. Succeeding 
will almost surely require utilization of all of the forms of 
central bank liquidity intervention described earlier and may 
involve substantial modifications in standard practices and 
procedures. In addition, as is fairly clear, the central bank could 
well become exposed to considerable market and credit risk.
In a systemic liquidity crisis, the key challenge facing 
central banks is to find ways to contain flight-to-quality and 
re-engage the private sector in the intermediation process. 
Such re-engagement will occur only as agents’ uncertainty 
over outcomes is reduced. To this end, the central bank will 
have to perform an intermediating role, and its actions may 
be designed to supplement the role of banks or even bypass 
banks altogether. Indeed, whereas the primary function of the 
LOLR in traditional discussions is to liquefy the balance sheet 
of banks, the current crisis has highlighted that when faced 
with a systemic crisis in a market-based financial system, the 
scope of LOLR support is likely to be much broader and 
involve interventions more akin to liquefying the limit order 
book of a particular market.
Typically, this will require a broadening of the central bank’s 
provision of liquidity both in terms of accessibility and 
structure. Tensions in the term funding market, for example, 
can be alleviated by the central bank both directly (through 
greater provision of term funding that offsets some of the 
shortfall in market supply) and indirectly (through the 
assurance of access to liquidity directly from the central bank). 
To the extent that the latter helps to ease intermediaries’ 
concerns about rollover risk, they may become more willing to 
extend term loans. At the same time, the set of institutions with 
which the central bank transacts may need to be expanded to 
ensure that the interventions reach those most in need.
A basic thrust of liquidity operations during a systemic crisis 
is to accommodate the increase in demand for assets of 
unquestionable quality while at the same time financing those 
institutions that find it hard to borrow in the market. This 
involves shifting the asset composition of central banks’ 
balance sheets away from highly liquid assets (primarily 
government securities) toward less liquid ones (typically 
private sector debt). In some instances, it may be necessary to 
sidestep the banking system and provide funding directly to 
borrowers and investors in key credit markets. This may be 
accomplished through outright purchases of, or lending 
against, specific classes of debt linked to particular market 
segments (for example, mortgages or corporate bonds). By 
reassuring investors that a committed buyer is in the market, 
such interventions may reduce the liquidity premium on 
various asset classes and boost the flow of credit. More 
generally, market prices may be influenced through the 
portfolio balance effect, whereby the change in the relative 
supplies of imperfectly substitutable private and public 
securities will lower the premium that the private sector 
demands for holding risky private securities at the margin. 
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operations, the liquidity premium that might otherwise be 
needed to induce investors to hold that asset will be reduced.
Because the purpose of these policies is to affect market 
pricing of specific assets independently of the overnight rate, it 
will be difficult to distinguish them from the stance of monetary 
policy per se. They also represent a departure from the 
conventional view that monetary policy should refrain from 
directly influencing relative prices by not targeting specific asset 
prices. Indeed, whether yield spreads are too wide or whether 
specific bonds are rationally priced given the amount of risk 
inherent in the prevailing economic outlook is largely a 
subjective assessment. Justification for such policy actions, then, 
rests on the same logic that has been used to motivate foreign 
exchange interventions—the enhancement of two-way liquidity 
or the attempt to move a misaligned asset price.
Ultimately, though, a systemic crisis is less amenable to 
central bank intervention. Central bank tools are much more 
limited in this context, since the fundamental problem is more 
greatly removed from monetary policymakers’ sphere of 
influence. The bulk of market and funding liquidity is 
generated through transactions among private entities and, as 
such, is created endogenously in the financial system. In an 
environment where there is pervasive uncertainty about banks’ 
balance sheets, both because asset valuations of various types 
become problematic and because of incomplete knowledge 
about what assets each bank holds, a central bank’s liquidity 
operations can ease these problems only indirectly, alleviating 
the symptoms rather than the cause. Central banks can provide 
liquidity by transacting with market participants, but they are 
not able to directly ensure that private agents will transact with 
each other.
In the end, whether central bank actions are effective in 
attenuating the impact of a systemic crisis and restoring the 
functioning of markets depends on the extent to which they 
have a catalytic effect on mutually voluntary private sector 
transactions. A key aim would be to generate a virtuous cycle 
that relies primarily on the private sector to re-establish 
liquidity in interconnected markets. In this respect, 
announcements of intended actions can be sufficient if they are 
credible. During the 1987 crisis, for example, the Federal 
Reserve not only encouraged banks and securities firms to 
make credit available to brokers and dealers but also issued very 
public statements affirming its commitment to providing 
liquidity. Carlson (2007) argues that the latter was critical to 
stabilizing the situation.
By extension, ambiguity of access to central bank liquidity 
facilities is likely to be counterproductive during a systemic 
crisis. On the contrary, uniform access for all financial 
institutions, irrespective of their condition and systemic 
importance, is more likely to alleviate heightened counterparty 
fears. Standing facilities and loan guarantees are examples of 
intervention that can have this kind of catalytic effect without 
the liquidity actually being drawn upon. For example, several 
of the new facilities introduced by the Federal Reserve in the 
current crisis are available at the discretion of market 
participants (the PDCF, AMLF, CPFF, MMIFF, and TALF), 
while others appear to have been structured to encourage 
market intermediation of credit.10
Importantly, the implementation of such measures involves 
an intricate balancing act. To the extent that an expanded 
intermediation role discourages financial institutions from 
dealing with one another, the central bank’s response may 
create countervailing forces between catalyzing market activity 
on the one hand and substituting for it on the other. The onus 
then falls on the design of an appropriate pricing structure and 
well-defined exit strategies, both of which can be difficult to 
achieve in practice.
Finally, in a situation of generalized market failure, it makes 
less sense for liquidity support to be provided at a penalty rate 
relative to prevailing market rates since no particular 
institution is benefiting relative to others. In fact, liquidity 
support will often, and probably should, be provided at a 
subsidized rate when it involves an illiquid asset in which a 
market price cannot be found. That said, liquidity facilities may 
be designed in ways so that accessing them is not punitive when 
markets are dysfunctional and is punitive when normal activity 
returns.11 Doing so would also naturally lead to an automatic 
run-off of liquidity support as markets stabilize.
3.4 Lender of Last Resort and Moral Hazard
The creation of moral hazard is a long-standing concern 
associated with LOLR operations. Goodhart (2007), for 
example, argues that generous provision of liquidity by central 
banks, in normal times and in times of crisis, has made banks 
careless in managing their liquidity risks. With this in mind, it 
is useful to assess the nature of moral hazard in light of the 
different types of liquidity shortages we set out here. As will 
become apparent, we view the moral hazard created by the 
LOLR as either relatively unimportant in practice or an issue 
10 The TALF (Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility), for example, 
provides term credit against newly issued asset-backed securities rather than 
outright purchases, which creates an incentive for participants to establish 
sound collateral for the securities since they are likely to be kept on their books. 
The PDCF is the Primary Dealer Credit Facility; the AMLF is the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility; the CPFF is the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility; the MMIFF is the Money Market Investor 
Funding Facility.
11 Many of the Federal Reserve’s new facilities in the current crisis are designed 
this way. The CPFF, for example, charges a fixed spread over the three-month 
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that is best addressed by other facets of policy not directly 
associated with the provision of liquidity support itself.
With respect to shortages of central bank liquidity, the 
potential for moral hazard arises if the provision of liquidity 
support reduces the incentive for financial institutions to 
devote resources to enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of their daily liquidity management operations. Moreover, 
excessive reliance on the central bank for daily liquidity 
management would substantially undermine private interbank 
market activity. Central banks have generally responded to 
these issues successfully through the establishment of a pricing 
structure that preserves the incentive for market participants to 
trade with one another before going to the central bank’s 
standing facility.
Looking at the case of an acute shortage of funding liquidity 
at specific institutions, we note that the underlying moral 
hazard concern is that the extension of liquidity assistance 
could establish precedents that lead to lax risk management 
and make financial institutions generally more vulnerable to 
shocks. Attempts to address these concerns have centered on 
both the prevention of potential problems through regulatory 
frameworks such as prompt corrective action and the 
imposition of highly punitive financial and nonfinancial 
penalties on management and shareholders in the process of 
crisis resolution. The latter makes it unlikely that expectations 
of liquidity support will directly contribute to the taking on of 
excessively risky activities. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
creditors are protected from losses, the exercise of market 
discipline is weakened. This in and of itself may facilitate 
(rather than cause) the pursuit of excessively aggressive 
business strategies.
Finally, in situations of systemic crisis, the underlying 
coordination failures that trigger the crisis cannot be easily 
attributed to anticipation by private agents of government 
support measures in the event of a financial meltdown, so it is 
difficult to see how it could have been the outcome of moral 
hazard. Indeed, if one views the evaporation of liquidity in key 
financial markets as a form of market failure—associated with 
the inability of markets to cope with aggregate, as opposed to 
idiosyncratic, liquidity shocks—a case can be made that the 
provision of liquidity support in systemic crises serves to 
enhance social welfare (see, for example, Kearns and Lowe 
[2008]).
At the same time, expectations of generalized liquidity 
provision by the central bank in systemic crises may lead 
institutions to neglect the task of building buffers that can be 
run down during such events. In this way, the inherent 
financial fragility that potentially contributes to making 
systemic crises more likely may be partly attributable to 
complacencies in risk management associated with 
anticipation of central bank intervention. This does not, 
however, constitute grounds for the central bank to refrain 
from providing support should a systemic crisis occur, nor 
does it suggest that provision at that time should be on highly 
punitive terms. Economically and politically, authorities have 
little choice but to act in the midst of a crisis, and any ex ante 
stance precluding provision of such support cannot be made 
credible. Thus, even if the existence of the central bank’s 
liquidity facilities creates moral hazard, efforts to mitigate it are 
more productively channeled elsewhere. Insofar as crises are 
associated with complacency in risk management, mistaken 
assumptions about asset price trajectories that become evident 
only ex post, skewed compensation arrangements, limited 
liability, and overall financial conditions that encourage risk-
taking, the burden of their prevention falls more naturally on 
the appropriate management of macroeconomic policies and 
regulatory structures than on the specifics of the framework for 
emergency liquidity provision.
4. Liquidity Operations
during the Current Crisis:
The LOLR Perspective
In the face of the widespread financial market dislocations that 
began in August 2007, central banks have expanded liquidity 
operations, actively deploying their balance sheets to address all 
three types of liquidity shortages. While the inherent cause of 
the current crisis may be rooted in coordination failures and 
informational asymmetries—and so is not new—the scale and 
scope of the problem have necessitated measures in some 
countries that are clearly unprecedented. In particular, because 
institutions have come to depend on market-based sources of 
liabilities, replacing lost funding liquidity now requires 
interventions on a scale that is large relative to the size of the 
central bank’s balance sheet in normal times. This section 
outlines the general thrust of central banks’ actions from the 
perspective of their LOLR function.12
Each of the measures central banks have undertaken since 
the fall of 2007 can be seen as addressing directly or indirectly 
at least one of the three types of liquidity shortages. With 
respect to addressing shortages of central bank liquidity, the 
focus has been on accommodating the greater instability in the 
demand for reserves and alleviating distributional problems. 
These have been addressed by varying the size and frequency of 
operations—conducting them outside their regular schedule 
and in larger than usual amounts—broadening the number 
12 For further details on central bank actions, see Bank for International 
Settlements (2008b) and Committee on the Global Financial System (2008).38 Central Bank Tools and Liquidity Shortages
Chart 1
Policy Rates and Reference Market Rates
Percent
Sources: Bloomberg; national data.
a For the United States, federal funds target rate; for the euro area,
minimum bid rate; for the United Kingdom, official bank rate. 
b For the United States, effective federal funds rate; for the euro area,








































and type of counterparties, and enlarging the scope of eligible 
collateral. A key objective of these interventions has been to 
contain deviations of market rates from the official policy 
stance (Chart 1).
For acute shortages of funding liquidity at specific 
institutions, central banks have extended emergency lending 
assistance to various financial institutions. This involved, for 
example, the extension of credit to Northern Rock by the 
Bank of England; the Federal Reserve’s support for Bear 
Stearns, AIG, and Citigroup; and the Swiss National Bank’s 
financing of the transfer of distressed assets out of UBS. These 
actions were undertaken jointly with the fiscal authority and 
generally structured to minimize the financial risk to the 
central bank.
Finally, there have been four broad components to efforts 
aimed at alleviating systemic shortages of funding and market 
liquidity. First, central banks have sought to ensure the 
availability of backstop liquidity to key financial institutions as 
reflected, for example, in the creation of the Federal Reserve’s 
PDCF, which established overnight funding for primary 
dealers. Second, there has been an effort to provide greater 
assurance of the availability of term funding through the 
lengthening of the maturity on refinancing operations as well 
as the establishment of inter–central-bank swap lines to ensure 
the availability of (primarily) dollar funding in offshore 
markets. Third, policymakers have worked to provide high-
quality securities—usually sovereign ones—in exchange for 
lower quality, less liquid securities in order to encourage 
trading in the latter. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England, for example, established facilities to lend government 
securities in exchange for less liquid market securities. Fourth, 
there have been initiatives aimed at ensuring the availability of 
credit to non-banks in cases where particular financial markets 
had become inoperative. The Federal Reserve’s extension of 
credit through the CPFF and the TALF, direct purchases of 
mortgage-backed securities issued by key government agencies, 
and the Bank of Japan’s outright purchases of commercial 
paper are examples of such an approach.13
Over the past sixteen months, central bank actions have 
covered this broad spectrum through two main phases. During 
13 It is useful to emphasize that these somewhat unconventional liquidity 
operations can be applied regardless of the level of the policy rate itself. Central 
bank balance sheets can expand aggressively even when interest rates are 
positive, contrary to the widely held view that such expansion can take place 
only at the cost of pushing rates to zero. The latter view is often based on 
Japan’s “quantitative easing” experience; however, the ability to expand the 
balance sheet without compromising targets for interest rates is constrained 
only by central banks’ capacity to offset the impact on bank reserves. Indeed, 
Asian central banks that have seen their balance sheets expand in recent years 
with the sustained accumulation of foreign reserves have, on the whole, been 
able to maintain their interest rate targets. Disyatat (2008) provides further 
discussion of these issues.
the first phase (through mid-September 2008), central bank 
efforts were undertaken by varying the asset composition of 
their balance sheets while keeping the overall size largely 
unchanged. As the crisis intensified following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, central bank operations entered a second 
phase that involved a rapid expansion of the size of their 
balance sheets. In particular, as central banks increased the size 
and scope of their efforts to support market functioning and 
undertook larger emergency lending assistance, offsetting 
operations on the asset side of their balance sheets became FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2010 39
Chart 2
Central Bank Assets
Billions of National Currency
Sources: Central banks; Datastream.
a Securities held outright (including Term Securities Lending Facility).
b Repurchase agreements, term auction credit, and other loans.
c Including U.S. dollar liquidity auctions.
d Of euro area residents and general government debt in euros.
e Including repos and other lending in euros. 








































Billions of National Currency
Sources: Central banks; Datastream.
a To other euro-area and non-euro-area residents, including central
banks.
b Including to central banks.















































constrained and it was necessary to expand the capacity of 
reserve-draining instruments on the liability side.
During the fall of 2008, the assets of the Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of England more than doubled in a matter of weeks, 
while those of the European Central Bank increased by more 
than 30 percent (Chart 2). In the case of the Federal Reserve, 
the growth in assets was driven by larger term operations, new 
lending facilities, and dollar swaps with other central banks. 
For the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, the 
expansion was driven mainly by repos and auctions of dollar 
liquidity. On the liability side, the increase in balance-sheet 
capacity of the Federal Reserve came from bank reserves and a 
one-off injection in the Treasury account (Chart 3). For the 
European Central Bank, the primary offsetting instrument has 
been the deposit facility, whereas the Bank of England has 
increasingly relied on the issuance of central bank bills.40 Central Bank Tools and Liquidity Shortages
5.C o n c l u s i o n
One hundred and thirty-five years ago, Walter Bagehot wrote 
that, to stay a banking panic, 1) the bank supplying reserves 
“must advance freely and vigorously to the public,” 2) “these 
loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest,” and 
3) “at this rate these advances should be made on all good 
banking securities, and as largely as the public ask for them” 
(1873, pp. 74-5). From these basic principles, central banks 
derived the theory of the lender of last resort. But Bagehot lived 
in a different world—not only were there no automobiles, 
airplanes, or computers, but there were very few central 
banks—fewer than 20, whereas today there are more than 170. 
Since central banks are essentially a twentieth-century 
phenomenon, it is natural to ask whether Bagehot’s 
nineteenth-century doctrine still applies.
In this paper, we have argued that Bagehot’s view of the 
lender of last resort requires modification. As the financial 
system has gained in complexity, so have all facets of the role of 
central banks. Following the trail blazed by Bagehot, we refine 
the theory of the LOLR by identifying three types of liquidity 
shortages that can occur in the modern financial system: 
1) a shortage of central bank liquidity, 2) an acute shortage 
of funding liquidity at a specific institution, and 3) a systemic 
shortage of funding and market liquidity.
Our analysis leads us to conclude that the appropriate 
principles for central banks’ LOLR support must be 
conditioned on the particular type of liquidity shortage that 
is taking place. When confronted with a simple shortage of 
central bank liquidity, for example, Bagehot’s dictum applies. 
By contrast, a systemic event almost surely requires lending at 
an effectively subsidized rate compared with the market rate 
while taking collateral of suspect quality.
In the same way, any discussion of communication policy 
in the potential future application of LOLR policy, such as 
the desirability of constructive ambiguity, must be linked to 
a specific type of liquidity shortage. So, for example, while 
ambiguity of access to central bank liquidity may be an 
important countervailing force against moral hazard in 
situations of acute institution-specific liquidity shortages, it is 
likely to be counterproductive when it comes to dealing with 
general shortages of central bank liquidity or while in the midst 
of a systemic crisis.
In terms of the debate outlined earlier on the appropriate 
form of LOLR lending, the current crisis has made it 
abundantly clear that the argument that only open market 
operations are needed to meet the liquidity needs of 
fundamentally sound banks is flawed since money markets 
themselves can fail to function properly. This is even more so 
in light of recent developments in the financial system that 
have increased the interdependencies between financial 
institutions and markets, and made it more imperative that 
central banks be prepared for situations in which both 
experience problems simultaneously.References
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